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Edwin C. Harris*

A Case Study in Tax Reform:
The Principal Residence

I. The Tax Reform Process
For most Canadians, "tax reform", in the abstract, is almost a
motherhood issue: of course we're in favor of it, particularly if we
are referring to that most obtrusive and resented of taxes, the
income tax. In fact, as of the end of 1983, we shall have lived
twelve years under an income tax r6gime that the federal
government was pleased to call "tax reform". Why, then, should
there be at least as much clamor for changes to the income tax now
as there was in the early 1960s, when the federal government of the
day felt impelled to appoint a Royal Commission on Taxation (the
Carter Commission) to make a thorough study of the much
criticized income tax law and to recommend major reforms? Plus fa
change.

While the intention to achieve "tax reform" was genuine, that
term seems most inappropriate to describe the turmoil that has
resulted in our income tax system, which is becoming less
manageable with each year's massive set of new amendments. In
retrospect, it was probably naive to expect any other result from this
prolonged process, which began over twenty years ago. Nevertheless, it is ironic that we should be hearing a growing demand for the
reform of tax reform.
After long deliberation, the Royal Commission on Taxation, in
its imposing report made public in early 1967, made sweeping
recommendations which, if implemented, would undoubtedly have
represented tax reform. Among the most important recommendations was a substantial extension of the tax base to include in
income such hitherto untaxed receipts as capital gains and gifts.
These recommendations, however, contained fatal weaknesses.
Some of these weaknesses were avoided in the white paper
("Proposals for Tax Reform") that the federal government issued in
November 1969 in response to the Royal Commission's report. The
white paper was much less ambitious in scope; thus, it proposed to
omit gifts from the tax base. But it, too, contained serious
*Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
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weaknesses. After receiving reports on the white paper from
committees of both the House of Commons and the Senate (the
latter report, in particular, being quite critical of the white paper),
the government unveiled its tax reform bill in June 1971.
The bill gave effect to many of the criticisms and further
narrowed the scope of the proposed changes to the existing income
tax system. Thus, only half of a taxpayer's net capital gains would
be included in his income. Even so, the massiveness of the bill, its
verbose and aesthetically unpleasing style of draftsmanship, and its
confusing new terminology and concepts (for example, "eligible
capital property" is not one kind of "capital property") created
many uncertainties of interpretation that took years to correct - at
least in part. The new act came into effect at the beginning of 1972,
after several amendments had been made to the bill in late 1971; but
that was just the beginning of the correction process, which
eventually continued in tandem with new "reforms", new
complexities, and new uncertainties of interpretation. These
objectionable developments were aggravated, on several occasions,
by unconscionably long delays, significant changes in the substance
of the provisions, budgets and income tax amending bills, and
delays in the issuance of necessary regulations that, when issued,
often had retroactive effect. Throughout this process, significant
changes in the administrative interpretation of the Income Tax Act
(the "act") by Revenue Canada, Taxation (the "department")
handed taxpayers and their advisers many unpleasant surprises. So
much for that major goal of tax reform - certainty. '
One area of particular vulnerability to uncertainty and change in
the proposals relating to the taxation of capital gains has been the
proper special treatment, if any, to be given to an individual's
"principal residence". Because it illustrates so well the process that
I have just described in general terms and because of its importance
with regard to both the value of property and the number of
taxpayers affected, I have chosen to describe in this article the
evolution of the special rules in our income tax law relating to
principal residences.

1. 1 have traced this process in two articles and (briefly) in a book. See Harris,
What Should Canada Do with the Carter Report?, 21 Bull. Int'l Fiscal
Documentation 531 (1967); Harris, Tax Reform in Canada - Stage 11, 24, ibid,
179 (1970); E. C. Harris, Canadian Income Taxation, chapter 1, s. 1.02 (2d ed.
1981; 3ded. 1983).
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II. The PrincipalResidence in the Tax Reform Proposals
The Royal Commission recommended that "gains on all forms of
property should be included in computing income, subject to a
limited exception for certain residential, including farm,
properties." ,2 The recommended exemption could accumulate up to
a lifetime total of $25,000 for each family unit or individual.
"Although the reasons for this exclusion are largely administrative,
there are also social implications. The complexities in maintaining
adequate cost records over the periods involved if gains on
residential properties were taxed would be considerably greater than
would be involved for other types of property." 3 Unfortunately, the
commission did not elaborate on the "social implications" that
apparently influenced its recommendations. It was concerned,
however, about possible claims for losses if gains on sales of
principal residences were taxed, and about pressures that would
likely develop, if such gains were taxed (as had occurred in the
United States), to allow "rollover" provisions - that is, provisions
postponing the recognition of a taxable gain on the sale of a
principal residence in certain cases, such as where the sold
residence is replaced within a limited period by a new principal
residence.
The commission proposed that, subject to the lifetime dollar
limit, gains on the sale of a building, and on the supporting or
surrounding land, used by the owner for residential purposes, as
well as on farm residential property, should be exempt. It suggested
that an individual who owns a principal residence should be
permitted, in lieu of keeping track of capital expenditures
representing improvements to his property so as to add them to the
cost of the property in order to compute its tax basis when it is sold,
to elect to add to his tax basis one percent of the cost of the building
for each year that the property is held. As well, farmers should be
permitted to add to the tax basis of their farm residences any related
interest and property taxes. The tax basis of a property that is used
for both business and residential purposes would need to be
apportioned between the two uses. 4 Losses on the disposition of a
5
principal residence would not be recognized for tax purposes.
2.
3.
4.
5.

3 Report of Royal Commission on Taxation 353 (1967).
Id., at 358.
Id., at 358-59.
Id., at 360.
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Like the Royal Commission, the authors of the white paper would
have taxed in full, when realized, capital gains that accrued after the
commencement of the new tax system; but they added certain
exceptions to this general rule. Thus, a capital gain on the sale of a
principal residence, including a farm house, would not be taxed
except to the extent that it exceeded $ 1,000 multiplied by the
number of years during which the property was occupied as the
taxpayer's principal residence. Losses on the disposition of such a
property would not be deductible. If records of capital improvements to the property were not kept, the taxpayer would be granted
a "home improvement allowance" of $150 per year of occupancy. 6
Rollovers would be allowed on the sale of a home and the purchase
of another when the taxpayer moved to another part of Canada on a
change of employment. Only one principal residence would be
recognized per unattached taxpayer or per married couple, except in
the case of a formal separation. 7
Interestingly, the white paper offered some explanation of the
"social implications" to which the Royal Commission had referred.
In what must rank as one of the most fatuous rationalizations ever
offered by a Canadian government for a tax measure, the white
paper said that ". . . the government does not feel that it would be
appropriate to treat the homeowner's gain as ordinary income.
Home ownership is part of the Canadian way of life, and within
reasonable limits the profits on the sale of a personal residence
would be treated as a recovery of the personal expenses of the
homeowner." 8 In a devastating criticism of the white paper
proposals relating to principal residences, 9 Horst G. Wolff pointed
out that "the taking of employment and the conduct of business for
gain are part of the Canadian way of life as well." Yet gains from
these activities have long been taxed in Canada. Wolff concluded
that "the exemption of gains would result in inequity in the tax
treatment of renters as compared to home-owners; and the fixed
dollar limitation on the exemption would result in inequity among

6. Proposals for Tax Reform, s. 3.19 (1969).
7. Id., s. 3.20.
8. Id., s. 3.6. My translation is: the government judges that the taxation of gains
on principal residences is simply politically unsaleable. This, in my view, was
undoubtedly a correct conclusion.
9. Wolff, The White Paper: Tax Treatment of PrincipalResidences, 18 Can. Tax
J. 263, 268 (1970).
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home-owners." 1 0 The exemption would aggravate the inequity that
would result from not taxing homeowners on "imputed rent" that is, the advantage of not having to pay rent for accommodation
out of after-tax earnings. Even the Royal Commission did not
recommend that imputed rent be taxed. I agree with the commission
(notwithstanding Wolff's doubts) that the effective taxation of
imputed rent involves formidable administrative difficulties. More
importantly, it was and is, in my view, politically unfeasible to
attempt to tax imputed rent in Canada. 1 Once, however, it was
conceded that imputed rent is not to be taxed, the basic goals of
equity and neutrality by which the "comprehensive tax base"
proposed by the commission was justified were seriously
compromised.
If it is decided that gains on principal residences should be given
preferential tax treatment, Wolff suggested that we adopt the United
Kingdom's approach in preference to the proposals of the Royal
Commission and the white paper. If the United Kingdom's
approach was followed, any gain on the sale of a residential
property would be reduced (or eliminated) by the proportion of the
total time during which it was owned by the taxpayer and it
qualified as his principal residence. Up to one acre of land
associated with a principal residence would be exempt on the same
basis, but in certain cases a larger piece of land could qualify. 12 As
we shall see, this approach, in essence, was adopted in the
amending bill.
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs, in its report on the white paper, 13
recommended that, in general, only half of net capital gains be
taxable. It proposed the adoption of the United Kingdom's rule with
respect to one acre of land associated with a principal residence, it
would have substituted an annual allowance for growth in value of
$1,500 for the $1,000 proposed in the white paper, and it would not
have granted a rollover where a principal residence was sold and
replaced because of the owner's change of employment. 14
In its report on the white paper, 1 5 the Standing Senate Committee
10.
11.
12,
13.
14.
15.

Id., at 263.
Id., see the discussion at 265-67.
Id., see the discussion at 271-74.
Report dated October 1970.
Id., at s. 3.21B.
Report dated September 1970.
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on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended a $50,000 lifetime
principal-residence exemption for an individual and his or her
spouse and a rollover for any gain on a principal residence that is
sold and replaced within a year. It also proposed a $75,000 lifetime
exemption for the sale of farms. 1 6 With respect to capital gains in
general, it proposed full taxation of gains on properties held for less
than one year and half-rate taxation (or a twenty-five percent tax, if
less) on most longer-term gains.
In June 1971, the federal government unveiled its ponderous Bill
C-259 to amend the Income Tax Act. In general, the bill provided
that half of net realized capital gains, to the extent that they accrued
after the end of 1971, would be included in income, but an
exemption was provided for gains on principal residences,
following the pattern set by the United Kingdom. In an
accompanying explanatory booklet, 17 the Department of Finance
explained these provisions as follows:
Many who commented on the [white paper] provisions felt that
substantial tax liabilities would still occur in areas where pressure
on the housing market pushed prices up strongly and that
homeowners would continue to face uncertainty about their tax
position. It was also argued that the economic use of our housing
stock might be inhibited if families could not 'move up' to larger
houses as they grew and established themselves.
The Government has decided that these arguments can best be
met by a complete exemption. This will save homeowners from
valuation problems and meet the very strong views of Canadian
homeowners and many other Canadians who aspire to home
ownership. '8
Subject to some amendments that were added by the government in
late 1971, the principal-residence provisions contained in Bill
C-259 became part of the new Income Tax Act at the beginning of
1972.
III. Legislative History
It should be helpful to begin with the text of the present relevant
provisions of the act, including those enacted in 1983 at the
conclusion of the distressingly protracted budgetary and amendment
16. Id., at 58-59.
17.
18.
bill,
as a

Summary of 1971 Tax Reform Legislation (June 18, 1971).
Id., at 31. Actually, because of the apportionment formula provided for in the
valuation problems might not be avoided where a home did not always qualify
principal residence while it was held by a taxpayer.
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process that commenced with the ill-conceived budget of November
12, 1981. Then the more significant changes that have been made in
those provisions since the beginning of 1972 will be traced. The
order in which these provisions will be considered here departs
somewhat from their sequence in the act in an effort to achieve a
more logical approach, but the interdependency of the provisions
prevents any sequence from being totally logical. Some critical
analysis will accompany the legislative history, but most of the
criticism will be reserved for the next section. Our procedure will be
to quote the text of each relevant provision of the act, followed
immediately by a reference to its legislative history and, where it
seems appropriate, some explanatory comment.
Paragraph54(g)
(g) "principal residence" of a taxpayer for a taxation year means
a housing unit, a leasehold interest therein, or a share of the
capital stock of a co-operative housing corporation, owned,
whether jointly with another person or otherwise, in the year by
the taxpayer, if the housing unit was, or if the share was acquired
for the sole purpose of acquiring the right to inhabit a housing
unit owned by the corporation that was,
(i) ordinarily inhabited in the year by the taxpayer, his spouse
or former spouse, or a child of the taxpayer who, during the
year, was wholly dependent upon him for support and was a
person described in subparagraph 109(l)(d)(i), (ii) or (iii), or
(ii) property in respect of which the taxpayer has made an
election for the year in accordance with subsection 45(2),
except that, subject to section 54.1, in no case shall any such
housing unit, interest or share, as the case may be, be considered
to be a taxpayer's principal residence for a year
(iii) unless it has been designated by him in prescribed form
and manner to be. his principal residence for that year and no
other such housing unit, leasehold interest or share has been so
designated for that year by him, by a person who was
throughout the year his spouse (other than a spouse who was
throughout the year living apart from, and was separated
pursuant to a judicial separation or written separation
agreement from, the taxpayer), by a person who was his child
(other than a child who was during the year a married person
or 18 years of age or over) or, where the taxpayer was not
during the year a married person or a person 18 years of age or
over, by a person who was
(A) his mother or father, or
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(B) his brother or sister and who was not during the year a
married person or a person 18 years of age or over, or
(iv) by virtue of subparagraph (ii), if by virtue of that
subparagraph the property would, but for this subparagraph,
have been his principal residence for four or more previous
taxation years,
and for the purposes of this paragraph the "principal residence"
of a taxpayer for a taxation year shall be deemed to include,
except where the property consists of a share of the capital stock
of a co-operative housing corporation, the land subjacent to the
housing unit and such portion of any immediately contiguous
land as may reasonably be regarded as contributing to the
taxpayer's use and enjoyment of the housing unit as a residence,
except that where the total area of the subjacent land and of that
portion exceeds 1/2 hectare, the excess shall be deemed not to
have contributed to the individual's use and enjoyment of the
housing unit as a residence unless the taxpayer establishes that it
was necessary to such use and enjoyment;
Several amendments to this definition in 1973-74, 1974-75-76,
and 1976-77 changed portions preceding subparagraph (iii) and
were made retroactive to the commencement of the application of
the principal-residence rules at the beginning of 1972. Thus, the
reference to "a leasehold interest therein" in the early part of the
definition was added to expand the exemption to cover circumstances where the taxpayer did not own the residence property but
had a relatively long-term leasehold interest in it that might be sold
for a gain. Subparagraph (i) originally referred only to the taxpayer
and not to the other members of his family; the amendments
permitted the exemption to be claimed where, for whatever reason,
the taxpayer himself did not reside in the property but one or more
members of his immediate family did - providing that the other
requirements, including his not designating any other property as
his principal residence for the same year, were met. In the part of
the definition immediately following subparagraph (ii), the addition
of the reference to a leasehold interest paralleled the change referred
to earlier. The reference to section 54. 1 accompanied the addition of
that section in 1974-75-76, retroactive to 1972, as will be discussed
presently.
Having regard to the strong recommendations of the Royal
Commission and the concurrence of almost all subsequent reports
and commentators that only one property should be eligible to
qualify as the principal residence of the members of a family unit at
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any one time, many practitioners were surprised to find, in the early
1970s, that the department interpreted paragraph 54(g) as
authorizing each spouse to have a separate principal residence. Each
spouse is a separate taxpayer under the act, and the phrase
"ordinarily inhabited in the year" appearing in subparagraph
(i) was not interpreted as requiring continuous occupation throughout the year or for any substantial period of the year; customarily
recurring occupation for limited periods, as in the case of a vacation
home, would suffice. 19 Thus, if a husband and wife held both a city
home and a country home, which they regularly occupied for a
period of each year, in common or joint ownership, each could
designate his or her half interest in one or the other property as a
principal residence, but his or her half interest in the other property
would then not be exempt. Practitioners resolved this problem by
recommending that the common or joint ownerships be severed and
that, instead, one spouse totally own one of the properties and the
other spouse totally own the other property. Then, both properties
could be totally sheltered from tax on any capital gain by being
designated their respective principal residences. The transfer of an
interest in a home from one spouse to the other would qualify for a
rollover, even with respect to an interest that was not the transferer's
principal residence. 20 The transferee spouse could then designate
the entire property that he or she now solely owned as his or her
principal residence for the full period during which he or she
ordinarily inhabited it - that is, for as long as it had been a family
residence after 1971.21
It took the government a surprisingly long time to recognize that
allowing a family to have two principal residences was not
originally intended and was not appropriate by any stretch of the
equity criterion. Horror stories were emerging that wealthy families
were expanding their exemptions even further by putting occasional
residences of theirs in the names of dependent children, each of
whom was also entitled to designate a principal residence. The
inevitable correction is contained in the most recent amendments to
19. See Interpretation Bulletin IT-120R2, "Principal Residence", paras. 6, 8
(February 23, 1981). See also Schlamp v. The Queen, 82 DTC 6274, [1982]

C.T.C. 304 (Fed.Ct.T.D.); and McGregor, PrincipalResidence: Some Problems,
21 Can. TaxJ. 116(1973).
20. Act subs. 73(1). Subsequent statutory references are to the act, except where
otherwise indicated.
21. See Interpretation Bulletin IT-366, "Principal Residence - Transfer to
Spouse or Spouse Trust", paras. 7, 8 (March 28, 1977).
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subparagraph (iii), effective for 1982 and following years. In
addition to some relatively minor wording changes in the early part
of this subparagraph, the entire reference to the spouse and minor
children was added. Transitional relief was provided in the new
subsection 40(6), to be discussed later, for the situation where a
family had, under the previous rules, more than one principal
residence at the end of 1981.
The department has administratively eased the strict statutory
requirements regarding the designation of a principal residence. 22 In
an interpretation bulletin, the department states that "although it is
provided that an otherwise eligible residence is not a principal
residence for a taxation year unless it is designated as such in the
taxpayer's income tax return for the year in which the disposition or
the granting of an option to acquire the property occurs, the
Department's administrative position is that this designation need
not be filed with the taxpayer's income tax return unless a taxable
capital gain on the disposition of a principal residence occurs after
deducting the exempt portion of the gain or unless the taxpayer
wishes to file the designation in respect of property disposed of to
his spouse or a 'spouse trust'." 23 Here, as in many other areas, the
harsh requirements of the act have had to be mitigated by
administrative concession.
The final amendment to the definition in paragraph 54(g) was
enacted in 1983 as part of the government's metrication program,
substituting "1/2 hectare" for the previous "one acre" - and,
incidentally, thereby expanding somewhat the allowed area of
related land to the approximate equivalent of 1.235 acres. In this
way, the government chooses to convince us of the merits of
metrication!
Subparagraphs 109(l)(d)(i)-(iii), referred to in subparagraph
54(g)(i), list categories of dependent children in respect of whom a
taxpayer may deduct a child's "personal exemption" in computing
his taxable income. The references to subsection 45(2) in
subparagraphs 54(g)(ii) and (iv) will be explained later when
subsection 45(2) is discussed.

22. See also Income Tax Regulations s. 2301; Forms T2090, T2091.
23. Interpretation Bulletin IT-120R2, n. 19, supra, para. 9. See also Interpretation
Bulletin IT-366, n. 21,supra, para. 11.
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Section 54.1
(1) A taxation year in which a taxpayer does not ordinarily
inhabit his property as a consequence of the relocation of his or
his spouse's place of employment while he or his spouse, as the
case may be, is employed by an employer who is not a person to
whom he or his spouse is related shall be deemed not to be a
previous taxation year referred to in subpararaph 54(g)(iv) if
(a) the property subsequently becomes ordinarily inhabited by
him during the term of his or his spouse's employment by that
employer or before the end of the taxation year immediately
following the taxation year in which his or his spouse's
employment by that employer terminates, or
(b) he dies during the term of his or his spouse's employment
by that employer.
(2) In this section, "property", in relation to a taxpayer, means
a housing unit
(a) owned by him,
(b) in respect of which he has a leasehold interest, or
(c) in respect of which he owned a share of the capital stock of
a co-operative housing corporation if the share was acquired
for the sole purpose of acquiring the right to inhabit a housing
unit owned by the corporation
whether jointly with another person or otherwise in the year and
that at all times was at least 40 kilometres farther from his or his
spouse's new place of employment than was his subsequent place
or places of residence.
As indicated earlier, section 54.1 was added in 1974-75-76,
retroactive to the beginning of 1972, to expand the scope of the
definition of "principal residence" in paragraph 54(g). Section
54.1 was amended in 1976-77, retroactive in effect to the beginning
of 1972. The most recent amendment was enacted in 1983,
applicable after 1981, to substitute "40 kilometres" for the
previous "25 miles" in subsection 54.1(2). The significance of
section 54.1 will become apparent when we consider subsection
45(2).
Paragraphs40(2)(b) and (c)
(b) where the taxpayer is an individual, his gain for a taxation
year from the disposition of a property that was his principal
residence at any time after the date, (in this section referred to as
the "acquisition date") that is the later of December 31, 1971
and the day on which he last acquired or reacquired it, as the case
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may be, is his gain therefrom for the year otherwise determined
minus that proportion thereof that
(i) one plus the number of taxation years ending after the
acquisition date for which the property was his principal
residence and during which he was resident in Canada,
is of
(ii) the number of taxation years ending after the acquisition
date during which he owned the property whether jointly with
another person or otherwise;
(c) where the taxpayer is an individual, his gain for a taxation
year from the disposition of land used in a farming business
carried on by him that includes property that was at any time his
principal residence is
(i) his gain for the year, otherwise determined, from the
disposition of the portion of the land that does not include the
property that was his principal residence, plus his gain for the
year, if any, determined under paragraph (b) from the
disposition of the property that was his principal residence, or
(ii) if the taxpayer so elects in prescribed manner in respect of
the land, his gain for the year from the disposition of the land
including the property that was his principal residence,
determined without regard to paragraph (b) or subparagraph
(i) of this paragraph, less the aggregate of
(A) $1,000, and
(B) $1,000 for each taxation year ending after the
acquisition date for which the property was his principal
residence and during which he was resident in Canada;
These provisions contain the exemption formula for individual
taxpayers. As can be seen, the exemption is only available to
individuals, thereby excluding corporations. As well, only years
during which the taxpayer is resident in Canada will count toward
24
his exemption.
The significance of "one plus" or "$1,000, and" in the formulas
is that, in a year in which one residence is disposed of and another is
acquired, both residences cannot qualify as the taxpayer's principal
residence since, under subparagraph 54(g)(iii), he can have only
one principal residence in a year. To compensate, the formula in
effect allows a "free" year - even where a principal residence that
is disposed of is not replaced.
24. See also para. 49(1)(a); Income Tax Application Rules, 1971,
26(5)(c)(i)(D), para. 26(7)(c), s. 26.1; Income Tax Regulations s. 2300.

cl.
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The references in paragraphs 40(2)(b) and (c) to an "acquisition
date" and its definition in paragraph 40(2)(b) were added in
1977-78 to eliminate an unintended result from the apportionment
formula, particularly where the property was deemed to have been
disposed of after 1971 (as on a change of use) and was subsequently
deemed to have been reacquired. Where, in the case of farm
property, an election is made to use subparagraph 40(2)(c)(ii), the
need to separate the total property and its cost and proceeds into
farming and residential portions is avoided. It should be noticed that
the formulas do not grant a "home improvement allowance" to
relieve a taxpayer, for whom a particular property has not always
qualified as a principal residence, from the need to keep records of
capital improvements.
Subsection 40(4) and (5)
(4) Where a taxpayer has, after 1971, disposed of property to an
individual who is deemed by subsection 70(6) or 73(1) to have
acquired it for an amount equal to its adjusted cost base to the
taxpayer immediately before the disposition, for the purposes of
computing the individual's gain from the disposition of the
property under paragraph (2)(b) or (c), as the case may be,
(a) the individual shall be deemed to have owned the property
throughout the period during which the taxpayer owned it;
(b) the property shall be deemed to have been the individual's
principal residence
(i) in any case where subsection 70(6) is applicable, for any
taxation year for which it would, if the taxpayer had
designated it in prescribed manner to have been his
principal residence for that year, have been the taxpayer's
principal residence, and
(ii) in any case where subsection 73(1) is applicable, for
any taxation year for which it was the taxpayer's principal
residence; and
(c) where the individual is a trust, the trust shall be deemed to
have been resident in Canada during each taxation year during
which the taxpayer was resident in Canada.
(5) For the purposes of determining whether any property of a
trust described in subsection 70(6) or 73(1) was its principal
residence for any taxation year, paragraph 54(g) shall be read as
if
(a) the reference in subparagraph (i) of that paragraph to "the
taxpayer" were read as a reference to the spouse referred to in
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subparagraph 70(6)(b)(i) or 73(l)(c)(i), as the case may be,
and
(b) the references in subparagraph (iii) of that paragraph to
"him" were read as references
to the trust and the spouse
25
mentioned in paragraph (a).
The references to subsections 70(6) and 73(1) are to provisions
that permit a rollover, upon death and during the lifetime of the
transferer, respectively, of capital property from one spouse to the
other or from one spouse to a qualifying trust established for the
other spouse. A minor technical amendment was made to paragraph
40(5)(a) in 1977-78 to change the cross-reference to subsection
73(1) as a result of simultaneous amendments to that subsection.
Subsection 40(6)
(6) Where a property was owned by a taxpayer, whether jointly
with another person or otherwise, at the end of 1981 and
continuously thereafter until disposed of by him, the amount of
the gain determined under paragraph (2)(b) in respect of the
disposition shall not exceed the amount, if any, by which the
aggregate of
(a) his gain calculated in accordance with paragraph (2)(b) on
the assumption that he had disposed of the property on
December 31, 1981 for proceeds of disposition equal to its fair
market value on that date, and
(b) his gain calculated in accordance with paragraph (2)(b) on
the assumption that paragraph (2)(b) applies and that
(i) he acquired the property on January 1, 1982 at a cost
equal to its proceeds of disposition as determined under
,paragraph (a), and
(ii) subparagraph (2)(b)(i) is read without reference to "one
plus"
exceeds
(c) the amount, if any, by which the fair market value of the
property on December 31, 1981 exceeds the proceeds of
disposition of the property determined without reference to
this subsection.
As indicated earlier, this subsection, enacted in 1983, was
intended to provide transitional relief where a family held more than
25. See also Tax Ruling TR-69, 'Designation of Principal Residence" (July 11,
1977); Interpretation Bulletin IT-366, n. 21, supra;Smellie Estate v. M.N.R., 77
DTC 308, [1977] C.T.C. 2435 (Tax Rev. Bd.).
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one principal residence at the end of 1981. A deemed disposition at
the end of 1981 would have benefited from the former rules
allowing a family to have more than one principal residence. Any
such property that is not designated as the family's principal
residence after 1981, because of the more restrictive rules then
applicable under the amendments to subparagraph 54(g)(iii), is not
sheltered from tax on any growth in value after 1981. Paragraph
(c) provides for the possibility that such a property may have
declined in value after 1981.
Subsection 45(2)
(2) For the purposes of this subdivision and section 13, where
subparagraph (1)(a)(i) and paragraph 13(7)(b) would otherwise
be applicable in respect of any property of a taxpayer for a
taxation year and the taxpayer so elects in his return of income for
the year under this Part, the taxpayer shall be deemed not to have
commenced to use the property for the purpose of gaining or
producing income therefrom or for the purpose of gaining or
producing income from a business except that, if in his return of
income for a subsequent year and under this Part he rescinds his
election in respect of the property, he shall be deemed to have
commenced so to use the property on the first day of that
subsequent year.
Subsection 45(1) provides, in general, for a deemed disposition
and deemed reacquisition, at fair market value, of capital property
owned by a taxpayer, the use of which has been changed from an
income earning purpose to another purpose, or vice versa. An
important exception is provided in subsection 45(2), which was
substituted for the original version of that subsection in 1974-75-76
but with retroactive effect to the beginning of 1972.
Subsection 13(7) provides similar rules to those in subsection
45(1) on a change of use of depreciable property, providing, in
effect, for a deemed disposition or acquisition of depreciable
property. Specifically, paragraph 13(7)(b) provides that, for
purposes of the depreciable property rules, where a taxpayer who
has acquired property for another purpose commences to use it to
earn income, he is deemed to have acquired it at the time of change
of use at its then fair market value. Therefore, if the property
otherwise qualifies as depreciable, he is entitled thereafter to claim
capital cost allowance (that is, depreciation deductions) on it based
on that deemed capital cost. Subparagraph 45(1)(a)(i) provides that,
for purposes of the rules for determining capital gains or capital
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losses (rules which can apply to depreciable property - for capital
gains only - and to nondepreciable property, such as land, that
qualifies under the act as capital property), where a taxpayer who
has acquired property for another purpose commences to use it to
earn income, he is deemed to have disposed of it at the time of
change of use, and immediately thereafter to have reacquired it at its
then fair market value. This might give rise to an immediate capital
gain if the value of the property at that time exceeds its adjusted cost
base (that is, its basis for tax purposes), and could be very painful
for the taxpayer who has not in fact disposed of the property and has
received no actual proceeds. At the same time it will establish that
value as the new adjusted cost base of the property, so that any gain
that is taxed on its change of use will not be taxed again on its
26
subsequent disposition by the taxpayer.
Subsection 45(2) therefore appears to say that where a taxpayer
who owned an asset that was not being used to earn income
commences to use it to earn income in circumstances that would
qualify it as depreciable property, he can elect that the
change-of-use rules will not apply to that asset, in which case there
will be no deemed disposition and no deemed reacquisition for
purposes of the capital-gain rules and no deemed acquisition for
purposes of the depreciable-property rules. Consequently, the
taxpayer can avoid recognizing, at least for now, any accrued
capital gain on the asset. There will be no increase, however, in his
adjusted cost base of the asset, so that any accrued gain at that time
will continue to be potentially taxable (to the extent that it is not
eligible for exemption as a gain on a principal residence); and since
he is deemed not to have commenced to use the asset to earn
income, it does not qualify as depreciable property and is not
eligible for capital cost allowance while the election continues in
effect. 2 7 There is no time limit on the effect of the election once it
has been made, so that if it continues in force until the taxpayer,
while still owning the asset, ceases to use the asset to earn income,
there will be deemed to be no change of use at that later time either.
It is possible, however, for the taxpayer to revoke his election for
any year subsequent to the year for which the election was made, in
26. A deemed disposition is provided only for capital-gains purposes and not for
purposes of the depreciable-property rules because the latter rules do not apply to
an asset until it is acquired for the purpose of earning income. See Income Tax
Regulations, para. 1102(1)(c).

27. Id.

The Principal Residence 185

which case the change-of-use rules would apply as of that
subsequent year.
The most important application of subsection 45(2) is where an
individual who has held a property as his principal residence
commences to rent it to someone else. If he makes the election,
subparagraph 54(g)(ii) provides (quite generously) that the property
can continue to qualify as his principal residence while it is being
rented, even though it is not then "ordinarily inhabited" by him or
his family, if the other requirements of principal-residence status are
met. For such an election to help the taxpayer to shelter a gain on
the ultimate realization of the property, the formula in paragraph
40(2)(b) or (c) requires that he continue to be resident in Canada in
those years.
Subparagraph 54(g)(iv), however, limits the benefit of the rule in
subparagraph 54(g)(ii) to a maximum of four years after the last
year in which the taxpayer or his family "ordinarily inhabited" the
property - except where the relieving provisions of section 54.1
apply. The termination of the principal-residence exemption, in
these circumstances, after four years does not affect the continuing
validity of the election for purposes of subsection 45(2), unless and
until that election is revoked; nor does it remove the taxpayer's
inability, while the election remains in effect, to claim capital cost
allowance on the building. Rather, he continues to be taxable on the
rents received and may deduct against them all proper expenses
relating to the property other than capital cost allowance. Unless
section 54.1 applies, however, any years after the fourth full year
that the election is in effect will not count, for purposes of paragraph
40(2)(b) or (c), as years during which the property was his principal
residence, but will count, of course, as years during which he
owned the property . 2 It takes some crystal-ball gazing for a
taxpayer to decide whether it is desirable to revoke his election with
respect to a property that has been his principal residence, effective
29
in the fifth year.
28. See also Interpretation Bulletin IT-399, "Principal Residence - Rental by
Non-Resident Owner" (November 14, 1977).
29. If he does and if the property until then has qualified each year as his principal
residence under either subparagraph 54(g)(i) or (ii), then the entire gain on a
deemed disposition at fair market value at that time could be exempt under para.
40(2)(b), but there would be no exemption for any subsequent growth in value. If
he leaves his election in effect until the property is sold, then the entire gain will be

apportioned equally, in effect, to each of the years when the property was held, and
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A principal residence also falls within the meaning of
"personal-use property", as defined in paragraph 54(f) of the act,
but it does not qualify as the kind of personal-use property that is
defined in paragraph 54(e) to be "listed personal property". This
means that losses on the disposition of a property that accrued while
it qualified as the taxpayer's principal residence will not be
recognized for tax purposes, since they are regarded as consumption
losses.

30

IV. Analysis
Some of the myriad uncertainties and interpretation problems raised
by the foregoing relatively brief provisions of the act have already
been referred to. In this section, we shall consider several more, but
by no means all, of these problems. Throughout the discussion it is
well to keep in mind that assets having a very substantial aggregate
value are being sheltered from tax by these rules.
In the definition of "principal residence" in paragraph 54 (g), it is
obviously necessary to exclude related land where the principal
residence is a share of a cooperative housing corporation. The
result, however, appears to be that there is no limitation on the size
of the land, either per housing unit or in the aggregate, that the
corporation may hold as part of its residential property, unless the
land area is so substantial as to call into question the purpose for
which the taxpayer acquired a share of the corporation. At the same
time, the corporation itself is not exempt from tax on any gain that it
makes on disposing of part or all of a residential building or
associated land owned by it.
The half-hectare limitation seems arbitrary when one regards the
vastly different needs for land of different types of housing and the
substantial differences that one might expect in land areas between
urban and rural residences. 31 Regardless of the area of land, certain
burdens of proof rest on the taxpayer if the qualification of any part
of his land as part of his principal residence is challenged by the
a proportionate amount of the gain (subject to the "one plus" in the formula) will
be allocated to the nonexempt years.

30. See subpara. 40(2)(g)(iii). This restriction may not apply, however, to a
former principal residence that is not being personally used at the time that it is
disposed of at a loss.
31. If, in the case of farming property, the taxpayer ultimately elects to use
subpara. 40(2)(c)(ii), the area of the land associated with the principal residence

becomes irrelevant.
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department, but the nature of the burdens differs: if the land does
not exceed half a hectare, the taxpayer, if challenged, must show
32
that the land reasonably contributes to his use and enjoyment of
the housing unit as a residence; if the land exceeds half a hectare, he
must show that the excess was necessary to that use and that
enjoyment. Normally, however, the department will not question
the qualification of the related land if its area does not exceed half a
33
hectare.
No guidance is offered, either in the act or in departmental
pronouncements, as to how the lines are to be drawn on the ground
if the land exceeds half a hectare and the taxpayer cannot meet his
heavy burden of proof. As well, if some but not all of the excess
over half a hectare is proved to be necessary, it appears that no part
of the excess will qualify.
A principal residence, then, might consist of:
1. a house, or portion of a house (or a condominium), and the
related land or a portion of the related land - part or all of
which might be held jointly or (by Departmental interpretation) in common with another person, who may, but need
not, be the taxpayer's spouse, or (probably) jointly or in
common with two or more other persons; or
2. a leasehold interest in a housing unit, whether or not owned
jointly or in common with another person. It is not clear
whether a leasehold interest in land relating to the housing
unit also qualifies, but if it does, the land relating to the
housing unit would prima facie be confined to half a hectare,
unless the taxpayer can meet the heavy burden of showing
that, because of the size and location of the building and the
number of its tenants, or for some other good reason, a larger
piece of land was necessary for his use and enjoyment of the
housing unit as a residence. If he cannot sustain this burden
of proof, some interesting questions will arise concerning the
appropriate apportionment of his cost and his ultimate
proceeds of the leasehold interest between housing unit and
qualifying land, on the one hand, and nonqualifying land, on
the other (a similar problem can arise where the housing unit
is a condominium apartment in a large apartment building);
or
32. Obviously, the draftsman has failed to recognize that, where the property is not
occupied by the taxpayer but is occupied by one or more members of his immediate
family, the relevant use and enjoyment should be that of the family members who
occupy the property.
33. See generally, Interpretation Bulletin IT- 120R2, n. 19, supra, paras. 10-13;
Madsen v. M.N.R., 81 DTC I, [1980] C.T.C. 3022 (Tax Rev. Bd. - under
appeal); The Queen v. Yates. 83 DTC 5158, [1983] C.T.C. 105 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
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3. a share of a cooperative housing corporation, whether or not
owned jointly or in common with another person.
While only an individual taxpayer, and not a corporation, can
own a principal residence, we have seen that, in certain
circumstances provided for in subsections 40(4) and (5), a trust
(which for most purposes of the act is considered to be an
individual) 3 4 may own a principal residence. If the taxpayer has one
or more co-owners, it appears, despite some weaknesses in the
wording of paragraph 54(g), that only the taxpayer's proportionate
35
interest in the property can represent his principal residence.
It is implicit in paragraph 54(g) and explicit or implicit elsewhere
in the act and in its regulations 36 that a building and the related land
are two distinct properties, even if they both qualify as a taxpayer's
principal residence. Yet the implications of two distinct properties
qualifying as a single principal residence have not been properly
addressed either in the legislation or in departmental interpretations
of it. 37 Consider, for example, the careless wording of paragraph
40(2)(c), which refers only to "land" in a context where this term
was presumably intended to include one or more buildings.
The requirement, for an election to be available under subsection
45(2) on a change of use of what has been a principal residence, that
both subparagraph 45(l)(a)(i) and paragraph 13(7)(b) apply can
only relate to the building component of the taxpayer's principal
residence and not to its land component, which is not depreciable
property and is not subject to section 13.38 Consequently, it should
follow that, even if an election is made, the land ceases to qualify as
34. See subs. 104(2).
35. See also The Queen v. Mitosinka, 78 DTC 6432, [1978] C.T.C. 664 (Fed.

Ct.T.D.); Interpretation Bulletin IT-437, "Ownership of Dwelling Property"
(September 10, 1979).
36. See, for example, s. 68 and the related case law; Income Tax Regulations
subs. 1102(2) and Schedule II, Class 8, subpara. (i)(i).
37. See, for example, Interpretation Bulletin IT-120R2, n. 19, supra, para., 14.

Compare the confusion created by the definition of "former business property" in
subs. 248(1), which seems to refer to two properties, and subs. 44(6), which treats
the land and the building as a single property: the depreciable and the
nondepreciable elements - that is, the building and the land, respectively - must
still be segregated in order to apply subss. 13(4) and 44(l). Somewhat similar
confusion is created by Income Tax Regulations subs. 1100(14), which refers to a
rental building but ignores the related land, which is appropriate for purposes of
Income Tax Regulations subs. I 101(lac) but not for purposes of paras. 1100(1 l)(a)

and (b) in those regulations.
38. See Income Tax Regulations subs. 1102(2).
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a principal residence on the change of use. Obviously, this result
was not intended by the draftsman and is being ignored by the
department.
The confusion in interpretation becomes particularly relevant
where the taxpayer holds vacant land for one or more years before
constructing his residence on it. The department says that:
Where a taxpayer acquires land in one year and constructs a
residence on it in another year, he may not designate the property
as his principal residence until the taxation year in which he
commences to ordinarily inhabit the residence. The prior years,
when he owned only the vacant lot (or the lot with a residence
under construction) would not be included in the numerator of the
formula in paragraph 40(2)(b). However, in determining the
number of years during which the taxpayer owned the
"property" referred to in the denominator of the formula, all
years commencing with the year during which he acquired the
vacant land would be included. Therefore, it is possible that
when the principal residence is later disposed of only part of the
gain may be exempted under paragraph 40(2)(b). For example,
where a taxpayer acquired vacant land for $15,000 in 1972,
constructed a residence on it costing $45,000, which he started to
ordinarily inhabit in October 1975, and disposed of his principal
residence for $90,000 during 1977, the taxpayer would realize a

capital gain of $30,000
of which $20,000 (
9
would be exempt .

i

+3

X

30,000)

Apart from creating a trap for the unwary, this interpretation is at
least arguably incorrect. Instead, the land and the building could be
treated as separate properties, which ultimately come together to
form a single principal residence, and the formula in paragraph
40(2)(b) could apply separately to each. Thus, using the
department's example and assuming that one-third of the total
proceeds of $90,000 (that is, $30,000) represented proceeds of the
land and that construction of the residence had started in 1974 or
1975, the gain on the land would be $15,000, of which '+_3 x
$15,000, that is, $10,000, would be exempt. The gain on the
building would be $15,000, all of which would be exempt. By this
approach, the total capital gain to be recognized on the land and
building would be $5,000 (land only), as compared with $10,000
under the department's interpretation.
For a property to qualify as a principal residence under paragraph
54(g), it is not necessary that it be situated in Canada. For example,
39. Interpretation Bulletin IT-120R2, n. 19, supra, para. 19.
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a condominium in Florida will qualify if it meets the requirements
of that paragraph. As we have seen, however, if the taxpayer
himself is not resident in Canada at any time in a particular year,
that year will not count in the numerator of the formula in paragraph
40
40(2)(b) or under clause 40(2)(c)(ii)(B).
The recent amendments to subparagraph 54(g)(iii) may set the
stage for acrimonious family disputes. Where, in one or more years
after 1981, two or more members of the same immediate family
own separate properties that, were it not for that subparagraph as
amended, would qualify as their respective principal residences, the
first of them to dispose of his or her property and to designate it as a
principal residence for that year or those years will preclude the
other or others of them from making such a designation with respect
to his or their property or properties. If this situation is not foreseen
and provided for in a separation agreement, it could apply, after the
separation of spouses, in respect of years before the separation. As
well, the nuisance of having a second "valuation day" imposed by
subsection 40(6) for one or more of two or more residences which
were owned by members of the same immediate family at the end of
1981 is not likely to be popular with them, though it may affect only
a relatively small number of families.
The provisions of section 54.1, while welcome in a limited
number of cases, will create a state of continuing uncertainty
concerning the tax status of the rented residence after the fourth year
following the making of an election under subsection 45(2) with
respect to a former principal residence. That status for all
intervening years will not be clarified until the taxpayer returns to
occupy the property within the time limits provided for by
paragraph 54. 1(l)(a) or dies while the employment in question
continues - in which case the clarification is positive - or he
sooner disposes of the property, or designates another principal
residence for those years, or the new place of employment or place
of residence shifts to within the prohibited distance, or the taxpayer
or his spouse commences to work for another employer (even if that
other employer is a member of the same corporate group and a
successor to the business of the former employer) - in which case
the clarification is negative. This uncertainty may continue for
many years. No provision is made for relief if the building is
destroyed, or the property is expropriated, before one of the events
40. Id.; see also paras. 2, 39-42.
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referred to in paragraphs 54. l( l)(a) and (b) occurs, even if it is
replaced by an equivalent property; nor is there any relief if the
taxpayer or his spouse must retire from the employment in question
because of serious illness or injury and he or she dies after the
employment terminates, and, because of the illness or injury, he or
she was not able to reoccupy the original residence.
If the taxpayer is moving because he or his spouse changed
employers, there is a danger that section 54. 1 will not apply, since
the relocation must occur while he or his spouse is currently
employed by a qualifying employer. Consequently, it would be
wise in that situation to attempt to arrange to have the new contract
of employment commence before the move takes place. It is not
clear why these restrictions are necessary: the equity seems to be the
same where the taxpayer moves to look for work and whether the
gainful activity takes the form of carrying on a business (which does
not qualify under section 54. 1) or being employed by someone else
(which does).
It is not clear whether subsection 40(5) can apply to a trust which
was created before 1972, but which meets all the requirements of
subparagraph 70(6)(b)(i) or 73(l)(c)(i) to be a qualifying spousal
trust. If so, the occupation of the property by the beneficiary spouse
in years after 1971 would potentially qualify the property to be
designated as the principal residence of the trust for those years. In
the department's view, where a residence owned by a qualifying
spousal trust is designated by both the trust and the beneficiary
spouse as the principal residence of the trust for a particular year,
the spouse may not designate another property as his or her principal
residence for that year. 41 But this conclusion seems doubtful, given
the strict language of subsection 40(5) and subparagraph 54(g)(iii),
and this question is not affected by the recent amendments to
subparagraph 54(g)(iii). If, in fact, the spouse in that situation can
designate a simultaneous principal residence for himself or herself,
there is obviously an unintended "loophole" in the relevant
provisions.
It appears that subsection 40(6) may have inadvertently reduced
what otherwise would be the tax burden, in some cases, on the sale
of a property that has been a family's sole principal residence since
before 1982. For example, assume that the property was bought in
1979 at a cost of $80,000 and that it qualified as a principal
41. Interpretation Bulletin IT-366, n. 21, supra, para. 10.
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residence for one of the three calendar years ending before 1982;
assume also that its fair market value at the end of 1981 was
$110,000, that it qualified as a principal residence for three of the
next four years, and that it is sold in 1985 for $170,000. If
subsection 40(6) were not in the act, an application of the formula in
paragraph 40(2)(b) would result in a capital gain in 1985 of
$25,714. Applying subsection 40(6), the gain cannot exceed the
sum of the gain that would have resulted on a disposition at fair
market value at the end of 1981 ($10,000) and the gain that would
have resulted if the property had been acquired at its fair market
value at the beginning of 1982, and the taxpayer could not claim a
second benefit from the "one plus" in the formula ($15,000), or a
total of $25,000. The gain that must be recognized would, thus, be
reduced from $25,714 to $25,000.
V. Conclusions
What began as a relatively simple proposal to exempt a homeowner
from tax on capital gains made on the disposition of his principal
residence has become a morass of complexity, uncertainties, and
anomalies, and some of the original objectives of both the tax on
capital gains and the principal-residence exemption from that tax
have become obscured in that process. The result is not atypical of
many other aspects of "tax reform" in Canada.
What, then, is the price of tax reform? We can include legislative
complexity, instability, and uncertainty; inequity among taxpayers
who are affected differently by the rules without any justification for
the differences; administrative headaches for the department; and
compliance problems for taxpayers, at least some of which entail a
monetary cost. Is it tax reform at all? Some have suggested that the
process should have been called "tax deform".
Were these results inevitable? In precise terms, of course they
were not, but it can be asked whether they were in general.
Furthermore, there is every indication that the objectionable
features of the present rules relating to principal residences will
multiply, rather than diminish, as time goes on - perhaps in part in
an effort to deal with some of the remaining difficulties referred to
in this article, and thereby creating a whole new set of uncertainties
and interpretation problems. The "refinement" process appears to
have become a monster that feeds on itself.
Perhaps a different approach to legislative drafting and a different
administrative philosophy could have made tax reform work with
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respect to principal residences and with respect to other aspects of
Canadian income tax law. This possibility, however, remains to be
demonstrated. Are there any politicians, bureaucrats, or potential
royal commissioners who are brave enough to try again?

